Atlas of the World War II ( 1985 )

It has often been stated that World War II
was part of a European Civil War that
began in 1914 at the start of World War I.
This is partly true. In Europe, at least,
the two world wars were the two hideous
halves of the Anglo-German controversy
that was at the heart of both conflicts.
The question posed was: would Britain be
able, or willing, to maintain her vast
Empire in the face of German hegemony
on the continent of Europe? The answer
to that question never came. Britain, in
seeking to thwart German interests on
the Continent, eventually lost her whole
Empire in the attempt -an empire that
between the wars encompassed a quarter
of the earth's surface and an equal pro-
portion of its population. Put into that
context, both world wars were dangerous
for Britain to fight, jeopardizing the very
existence of the Empire and inevitably
weakening the mother country to the
point that she could not maintain her
world position at the end of the conflicts.
From Germany's point of view, the
wars were not only dangerous in that
they finally ruined virtually every town
and city, devastated the countryside and
dismembered the nation; they were
irrelevant. In 1890 Germany was in a
position from which, within a generation,
she would economically dominate the
whole of Europe. Inevitably, with that
economic hegemony, political hegemony
would soon follow, if not even precede. By
1910 the process was well in train; had no
one done anything to stop her, Germany
would have achieved the Kaiser's dreams
without war by the mid 1920s. The col-
lapse of Imperial Germany in 1918, fol-
lowed by temporary occupation, inflation
and national humiliation, set Germany
back only a few years. Despite the disas-ters of World War I and its aftermath,
Germany was quickly recovering her old
position - roughly that of 1910 - by the
time Hitler took power in 1933. By 1938
German power in Europe was greater
than ever before, and Britain had to face
the old question once again. Could she
condone German political dominance of
the Continent?
In 1938 some Conservatives, like
Chamberlain and Halifax, recognized the
threat and were tacitly willing to main-
tain the Imperial status quo and condone
Hitler. Other Tories, like Churchill and
the Labour and Liberal Parties, wanted
to challenge Germany again. Had Hitler
been a bit more discreet and less hurried,
perhaps a bit less flamboyant and virulently anti-Semitic, Chamberlain's
policy might have succeeded. Germany
would have extended her power in
Europe and the Empire would have been
maintained. But that was to ask the im-
possible, to wish that Hitler were some-
one other than Hitler. The result -
humiliation of Britain's policy when
Czechoslovakia was overrun in March
1939 - forced even Chamberlain's hand,
and the stage was set for round two of the
European Civil War.
World War II in Europe was very like a
Greek tragedy, wherein the elements of
disaster are present before the play be-
gins, and the tragedy is writ all the larger
because of the disaster's inevitability.
The story of the war, told through the
maps of Richard Natkiel in this volume,
are signposts for the historian of human
folly. In the end, Germany and Italy were
destroyed, along with much of Europe.
With the devastation came the inevitable
collapse of both the impoverished British
Empire and centuries of European
hegemony in the world. A broader look
from the perspective of the 1980s would
indicate a further irony. Despite Ger-
many's loss of part of its Polish and Rus-
sian territory and its division into two
countries, not to mention the separation
of Austria from the Reich and the semi-
permanent occupation of Berlin, the Ger-
man economic advance was only delayed,
not permanently stopped. The Federal
Republic is clearly the strongest economy
in Western Europe today and the fourth
strongest in the world. The German
Democratic Republic rates twelfth on
this basis. Together their economies are
roughly as strong as that of the Soviet
Union, and their political reunification is now less of a dream, more of a reality
toward which Germans on both sides of
the Iron Curtain are striving. One day,
probably within the next two decades, a
form of unification may take place, and
when it does, German power on the Con-
tinent will be greater than ever before.
No wonder the Soviets and many West-
ern Europeans view this prospect with
fear and cynicism. What had the world
wars been for? For what ideals had the
blood of tens of millions been spilt?
The irony of World War II becomes
even clearer when one views briefly its
second half, the struggle between Japan
and the United States for control of the
Pacific. The question facing American
Presidents from Theodore Roosevelt to
Franklin Roosevelt had been: could the United States maintain its security and
trade routes in the Pacific in the face of an
increasingly powerful Japanese Navy
and economy? For decades the question
was begged, until the Japanese took mat-
ters into their own hands at Pearl Har-
bor, the Philippines, Vietnam and
Malaya in 1941. The ensuing tragedy, as
inevitable in the Pacific as was its coun-
terpart in Europe, became obvious
almost from the outset. Millions died in
vain; Japan itself was devastated by fire
and atomic bombs, and eventually con-
ceded defeat.
From a forty-year perspective, what
was the point of the Pacific War? Japan
has the third largest economy in the
world and by far the largest in Asia. In
recent years the United States has
actually encouraged Japan to flex its
political muscles, increase its armed
forces and help the United States police
the Western Pacific. It would seem that
this conflict was as tragically futile as the
European Civil War.

Contents
Introduction 6
Blitzkrieg 10
The War in Northern Waters 32
The Desert War and the Mediterranean 42
Soviet Ambitions Betrayed 64
The Course of Global Conflict: 1939-45 78
The Japanese Juggernaut 96
The Italian Campaign 108
Ebb Tide in the Pacific 120
Retaking Burma: The Forgotten War 138
Russia Finds Its Strength 148
Fortress Europe Overthrown 166
Index 190